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Abstract
We describe a coalitional value from a non-cooperative point of view, assuming
coalitions are formed for the purpose of bargaining. The idea is that all the players
have the same chances to make proposals. This means that players maintain their
own “right to talk” when joining a coalition. The resulting value coincides with the
weighted Shapley value in the game between coalitions, with weights given by the
size of the coalitions. Moreover, the Harsanyi paradox (forming a coalition may be
disadvantageous) disappears for convex games.
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tures, Harsanyi paradox
1 Introduction
Many economic situations can be modelled as a set of agents or players with independent
interests who may benefit from cooperation. Moreover, it is not infrequent that these
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players have partitioned themselves into coalitions (such as unions, cartels, or syndicates)
for the purpose of bargaining.
Assuming that cooperation is carried out, the question is how to share the benefit
between the coalitions and between the members inside each coalition, i.e. which “coali-
tional value” best represents the expectation of each individual. The economic theory
has addressed this problem from two different points of view. One of them is axiomatic.
The other is non-cooperative.
The axiomatic point of view focuses on finding allocations which satisfy “fair” (or at
least “reasonable”) properties, such as efficiency (the final outcome must be efficient),
symmetry (players with the same characteristics must receive the same), etc. There is
an extensive literature on axiomatic characterization of coalitional values: Aumann and
Dreze (1974); Owen (1977); Hart and Kurz (1983); Levy and Mc Lean (1989); Alonso-
Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro (2002); Amer et al. (2002); M lodak (2003); Carreras and
Puente (2006); Kamijo (2009, 2013); Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2010); Calvo and
Gutie´rrez (2010), among others.
The non-cooperative point of view leads to the study of the allocations which arise
in a given non-cooperative environment. Some coalitional values have also been studied
from the non-cooperative point of view: Vidal-Puga and Bergantin˜os (2003); Vidal-Puga
(2005); Kamijo (2008). This paper also follows the non-cooperative approach.
Frequently, it is interpreted that players form coalition structures in order to improve
their bargaining strength (Hart and Kurz, 1983). However, as Harsanyi (1977) (p. 203)
points out, the bargaining strength does not improve in general. An individual can be
worse off bargaining as a member of a coalition than bargaining alone. Formally stated,
the Harsanyi paradox1 is as follows: Consider a simple n-person unanimity game in which
n players can share a pie of size 1 as long as all of them agree on the division. Under the
symmetry assumption, each player will typically expect to get a share of the pie of size
1/n. Assume now two players decide to join forces and act as one single player. Harsanyi
claims that this situation is equivalent to a symmetric (n− 1)-person unanimity game
and thus each player’s expectation should be a pie of size 1/ (n− 1). Hence, by joining
forces, the two players have moved from a joint expectation of 2/n to an expectation of
just 1/ (n− 1). Of course the same result holds if more than two players decide to act as
one player (except in the trivial case in which all n players participate in this agreement).
This paradox seems somehow problematic. It implies that cooperation (in the sense
of forming an a priori coalition) can be harmful in bargaining environments. Chae and
1Harsanyi calls it the joint-bargaining paradox.
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Heidhues (2004) (p. 47) provide the following explanation: By merging in a coalition
structure, players reduce their multiple “rights to talk” to a single right in the game
between coalitions, hence improving the position of the outsiders.
The meaning of “rights to talk” is not clear from an axiomatic viewpoint (see for
example Chae and Moulin (2010)). However, it has a natural interpretation in a non-
cooperative environment. Many non-cooperative mechanisms2 (for example, Rubinstein
(1982)) include a key stage in which one of the players should make a proposal. Hence,
the “right to talk” can be interpreted as the “right to make a proposal”. The Harsanyi
paradox may arise when this right is dispelled as the size of the coalition increases. For
example in the n-person unanimity game where two players act as one unit, the proposal
should come from one of the members of the joined coalition with a probability 1/ (n− 1),
whereas when no coalition is formed the proposal should come from one of them with
probability 2/n.
In this paper, we study the effects of maintaining the “rights to talk” of the players
inside a coalition. Hence, the coalitions with more members have more chances to make
proposals. In the previous example, this means that the proposal from a member of the
joined coalition will come with a probability 1/n, as if she were acting alone.
In particular, we generalize a non-cooperative mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996). In Hart and Mas-Colell’s model, a player is randomly chosen in order to propose
a payoff. If this proposal is not accepted by all the other players, the mechanism is played
again under the same conditions with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1). With probability 1− ρ, the
proposer leaves the game and the mechanism is repeated with the rest of the players.
In our model, this procedure is played in two stages. First, agreements are negotiated
within coalitions and then through delegates among coalitions. Each coalition acts as
a single unit in the second stage. The entire proposing coalition leaves the game when
the proposal made by one of its members is rejected by the other players. Moreover, the
probability of a coalition being chosen as proposer in the second stage is proportional to
its size3.
As a result, the resulting equilibrium payoff coincides with the coalitional value de-
scribed and axiomatized in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2010). In particular, we get the
weighted Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) in the game between coalitions, with weights
2To avoid ambiguities with cooperative games, we use the term non-cooperative mechanism, or simply
mechanism, rather than non-cooperative game.
3As opposed, if we give equal probability to each coalition, we obtain the mechanism presented by
Vidal-Puga (2005) which gives the Owen value as expected final outcome. However, our results are not
implied by the results in Vidal-Puga (2005) and the proofs are also different.
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given by the size of the coalition. Moreover, the final outcome in unanimity games is not
affected: The equilibrium payoffs would be the same irrespective of the coalition structure
(see Proposition 4.1). However, this is not true in general games (see Example 3.1 and
Example 4.1).
The new mechanism generalizes the mechanism of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), in the
sense that they coincide when the coalition structure is trivial (i.e. all the coalitions are
singletons, or there exists a unique coalition).
In Section 2 we present the notation used throughout the paper and some previous
results. In Section 3 we describe the coalitional value. In Section 4 we present the
formal mechanism and the main results. In Section 5 we discuss a generalization of the
mechanism. The proofs are located in Section 6 (Appendix).
2 Preliminaries
A non-transferable utility game, or NTU game, is a pair (N, V ) where N is a finite set
of players and V is a correspondence which assigns to each S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅ a nonempty,
closed, convex and bounded-above subset V (S) ⊂ RS representing all the possible payoffs
that the members of S can obtain for themselves when playing cooperatively. For S ⊂ N ,
we maintain the notation V when referring to the application V restricted to S as player
set. For simplicity, denote V (i) instead of V ({i}), S ∪ i instead of S ∪ {i} and N\i
instead of N\{i}. The set of NTU games is denoted as NTU . For each i ∈ N , let
ri := max {x : x ∈ V (i)}.
When V (S) =
{
x ∈ RS : ∑i∈S xi ≤ v (S)} for some v : 2N → R with v (∅) = 0, we
say (N, V ) is a transferable utility game (or TU game) and we represent it as (N, v). As
before, we maintain the notation v when referring to the application v restricted to 2S.
A TU game is superadditive if it satisfies v (S) + v (T ) ≤ v (S ∪ T ) for all S, T ⊂ N
with S ∩ T = ∅. A TU game is convex if it satisfies v (T ∪ i)− v (T ) ≤ v (S ∪ i)− v (S)
for all i ∈ N and T ⊂ S ⊂ N\i. If the previous inequalities are strict, the TU game
is strictly superadditive and strictly convex, respectively. All (strictly) convex TU games
are (strictly) superadditive. A unanimity game is a TU game satisfying v (N) = 1 and
v (S) = 0 otherwise. All unanimity games are convex.
When V (S) =
{
rS
}
for all S 6= N , where rSi = ri for all i ∈ S, and rN ∈ V (N), we
say that (N, V ) is a pure bargaining problem.
Unanimity games are both TU games and pure bargaining problems.
A coalition structure over N is a partition of the player set, i.e. C = {C1, C2, ..., Cm} ⊂
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2N is a coalition structure if it satisfies
⋃
Cq∈C Cq = N and Cq ∩ Cr = ∅ when q 6= r. We
also assume Cq 6= ∅ for all q. A coalition structure C over N is trivial if either C consists
of singletons or C = {N}. For any S ⊂ N , we denote the restriction of C to the players in
S as CS (notice that this implies that CS may have less or the same number of coalitions
as C). Given a TU game (N, v) and a coalition structure C = {C1, C2, ..., Cm} over
N , the game between coalitions is the TU game (M, v/C) where M = {1, 2, ...,m} and
v/C (Q) = v
(⋃
q∈QCq
)
for all Q ⊂M .
We denote an NTU game (N, V ) with coalition structure C over N as (N, V, C). We
denote the set of NTU games with coalition structure as CNTU .
Given a subset G of NTU or CNTU , a value in G is a correspondence ψ which
assigns to each (N, V ) ∈ G or (N, V, C) ∈ G a vector ψN (V ) ∈ RN . With a slight abuse
of notation, we say that ψN (V ) is the value of (N, V ), and each ψNi (V ) is the value of
i. A value ψ is efficient if ψN (V ) belongs to the Pareto frontier of V (N) for all (N, V ).
For any TU game (N, v), this condition is equivalent to say
∑
i∈N ψ
N
i (v) = v (N).
Two well-known efficient values in TU games and in bargaining problems are respec-
tively the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b) and the Nash solution (Nash, 1950). We denote
the Shapley value of the TU game (N, v) as ϕN (v) ∈ RN .
In NTU games that are both TU games and pure bargaining problems, the Shapley
value and the Nash solution coincide. In unanimity games, ϕNi (v) =
1
|N | for all i ∈ N .
A non symmetric generalization of ϕN (v) is the weighted Shapley value (Shapley,
1953a; Kalai and Samet, 1987, 1988). We denote the weighted Shapley value of the TU
game (N, v) as ϕωN (v) ∈ RN , where ω ∈ N is a vector of weights. When ωi = 1|N | for
all i, the weighted Shapley value coincides with the Shapley value.
The weight vector breaks the symmetric treatment of players in a TU game, but they
should not be interpreted as a measure of bargaining power. In particular, Owen (1968)
presented a simple example in which one of the players was worse-off when his weight
increased. See, for example, Haeringer (2006) (Example 1).
However, for convex games, a higher weight never implies a lower weighted Shapley
value (see Haeringer (2000) (Section 4)).
We now focus on TU games with coalition structure. Fix C = {C1, . . . , Cm} and
M = {1, ...,m}. Owen (1977) proposed an efficient value based on Shapley’s which takes
into account the coalition structure. We call this value the Owen coalitional value, or
simply the Owen value, and we denote it as φN (v). When the coalition structure is
trivial, i.e. C = {{i}}i∈N or C = {N}, the Owen value coincides with the Shapley value.
Levy and Mc Lean (1989) studied the weighted coalitional value with intracoalitional
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symmetry, that we denote as φωN (v). When C = {{i}}i∈N , this value coincides with the
weighted Shapley value. When C = {N}, it coincides with the Shapley value. When
ωq = ωr for all q, r, it coincides with the Owen value.
When there is no ambiguity, we write ϕN , φN , ϕωN , φωN instead of ϕN (v), φN (v),
ϕωN (v), φωN (v), respectively. With some abuse of notation, given S ⊂ N , we denote
as ϕωS and φωS the weighted Shapley value and the Levy-McLean coalitional value,
respectively, of the game (S, v) with weights ω′i =
|N |
|S|ωi for all i ∈ S.
We now define formally the Harsanyi paradox. Given Cq, Cr ∈ C, we define the
coalition structure Cq+r as (C\ {Cq, Cr}) ∪ {Cq ∪ Cr}. This means that the coalition
structure Cq+r arises from C when coalitions Cq, Cr join forces and act as a single coalition
Cq ∪Cr. Let ψ be a value defined on G ⊂ CNTU . Just in this case, we write ψN (C) and
ψN (Cq+r) when the coalition structure is given by C and Cq+r, respectively. We say that
ψ is joint-monotonic in G if ∑
i∈Cq∪Cr
ψNi (C) ≤
∑
i∈Cq∪Cr
ψNi
(Cq+r)
for all (N, V, C) ∈ G and all Cq, Cr ∈ C. A value yields the Harsanyi paradox if it is
not joint-monotonic in unanimity games. It is well-known that the Owen value is not
joint-monotonic in unanimity games. The Shapley value is joint-monotonic in all TU
games, but this is because ϕ does not take into account the coalition structure4.
When a value is not joint-monotonic, the members of a coalition can be better off
acting alone than acting as a single unit that tries to improve its members’ aggregate
payoff (cf. the explanation given by Harsanyi (1977) (p. 204-205)).
3 The coalitional value
One feature of the Owen value is that the aggregate value received by each coalition
depends only on the game between coalitions v/C. In fact, this is one of the properties
that Owen (1977) (Axiom A3) uses to characterize φ. Hart and Kurz (1983) (p.1051)
consider that this property “is the most difficult to accept”, and propose an alternative
characterization without it.
An important consequence of this property, together with symmetry, is that two
coalitions that affect the game between coalitions in a symmetric way will receive the
same aggregate payoff. Levy and Mc Lean (1989) (p.235) claim that this intercoalitional
symmetry may not be a reasonable requirement for a value. A classical example (Kalai
4For the same reason, the Nash solution is joint-monotonic in pure bargaining problems.
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and Samet, 1987) is the case where coalitions represent groups of different size. In these
cases it seems reasonable to assign a size-depending weight to each coalition. A natural
way to proceed is to give each coalition a weight proportional to its size (see Kalai and
Samet (1987) (Section 7) for additional arguments supporting this particular choice).
An obvious candidate is the Levy-McLean value φωN with weights ω given by ωq =
|Cq |
|N |
for each Cq ∈ C. However, we will use a different coalitional value ζN , that follows a similar
idea as φωN . This ζN is characterized in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2010, 2011), and
it is defined following a two-step procedure. In the first step, we define a reduced TU
game
(
Cq, v
∗N
q
)
for each Cq ∈ C as follows: Given T ⊂ Cq, let λ ∈ RM++ be the weight
system given by λq =
|T |
|N |−|Cq\T | and λr =
|Cr|
|N |−|Cq\T | otherwise. We then define:
v∗Nq (T ) := ϕ
λM
q
(
v/CN\(Cq\T )
)
for all T ⊂ Cq. Notice that ϕλM is the weighted Shapley value of the game between
coalitions.
We can interpreted v∗Nq (T ) as the worth of subcoalition T when players in Cq\T are
out.
In the second step, we use the Shapley value to determine the final allocation. The
formal definition is as follows:
Definition 3.1 Given a TU game with coalition structure (N, v, C), the value ζ is defined
as ζNi (v) := ϕ
Cq
i
(
v∗Nq
)
for all i ∈ Cq ∈ C.
As usual, we write ζN instead of ζN (v).
The following example will help to clarify the previous definition, comparing it to the
Owen value and the Levy-McLean value:
Example 3.1 Let (N, v) be the TU game defined as N = {1, 2, 3}, v ({1, 2}) = 12,
v (N) = 24, and v (S) = 0 otherwise. Let C = {C1, C2} with C1 = {1} and C2 = {2, 3}.
In this case, the game between coalitions ({1, 2} , v/C) is defined as v/C ({1}) =
v/C ({2}) = 0 and v/C ({1, 2}) = 24. The ((1
2
, 1
2
)
-weighted) Shapley value is (12, 12),
i.e. 12 for coalition C1 and 12 for coalition C2. Similarly, the
(
1
3
, 2
3
)
-weighted Shap-
ley value is (8, 16). When player 2 leaves N , the game between coalitions becomes the
null game
({1, 2} , v/C{1,3}) with v/C{1,3} ({1}) = v/C{1,3} ({2}) = v/C{1,3} ({1, 2}) = 0.
The (
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
-weighted) Shapley value and the
(
1
3
, 2
3
)
-weighted Shapley value are both (0, 0).
When player 3 leaves N , the game between coalitions becomes
({1, 2} , v/C{1,2}) with
v/C{1,2} ({1}) = v/C{1,2} ({2}) = 0 and v/C{1,2} ({1, 2}) = 12. The (
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
-weighted)
Shapley value is (6, 6) and the
(
1
3
, 2
3
)
-weighted Shapley value is (4, 8).
7
The reduced game
({1} , v∗N1 ) is defined as
v∗N1 ({1}) = ϕ(
1
3
, 2
3){1,2}
2
(
v/C{1,2}
)
= 8,
where
(
1
3
, 2
3
)
is the vector of weights for coalitions {1} and {2, 3}.
Similarly, the reduced game
({2, 3} , v∗N2 ) is defined as
v∗N2 ({2}) = ϕ(
1
2
, 1
2){1,2}
2
(
v/C{1,2}
)
= 6
v∗N2 ({3}) = ϕ(
1
2
, 1
2){1,2}
2
(
v/C{1,3}
)
= 0
v∗N2 ({2, 3}) = ϕ(
1
3
, 2
3){1,2}
2 (v/C) = 16.
Hence, ζN1 (v) = ϕ
{1}
1
(
v∗N1
)
= 8, ζN2 (v) = ϕ
{2,3}
2
(
v∗N2
)
= 11, and ζN3 (v) = ϕ
{2,3}
2
(
v∗N2
)
=
5, i.e. ζN (v) = (8, 11, 5).
As opposed, φN defines the reduced game using the Shapley value, so that φN (v) =
(12, 9, 3) (see Owen (1977) for details) and φωN defines the reduced game using the
(
1
3
, 2
3
)
-
weighted Shapley value, so that φωN (v) = (8, 12, 4) (see Levy and Mc Lean (1989) (Propo-
sition C(2)) for details).
The critical difference between the definitions of ζ and the Levy-McLean value φω is
that the weights λ that appear in the definition of v∗Nq (T ) depend on T , whereas in the
definition of φω (see Levy and Mc Lean (1989) (Proposition C(2))) the weights are the
same for each possible T . On the other hand, in the definition of the Owen value, the
Shapley value is used in both steps.
Remark 3.1 It follows from the definition of ζ that each coalition gets its weighted Shap-
ley value of the game between coalitions, with weights given by their size. Namely, for
any Cq ∈ C,
∑
i∈Cq ζ
N
i = ϕ
λM
q (v/C).
One practical problem with the above definition is that ζN is extremely laborious to
compute, being necessary to calculate
∑m
q=1 2
|Cq | distinct weighted Shapley value vectors
(to identify v∗Nq ), and then calculate m distinct Shapley value vectors (to identify ϕ
Cq).
In Section 6 (Proposition 6.1), we provide an easily implementable recursive formula to
compute ζ that allows to overcome this difficulty5.
A different issue would be to study the complexity in the computation of ζ. By
Proposition 6.1, ζN is independent of the worth of coalitions S ⊂ N that have proper
5There exists a similar formula for the (weighted) Shapley value (see Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001) (Lemma 1)).
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intersection with more than one Cq. This property is called Coordination in Go´mez-Ru´a
and Vidal-Puga (2010) and it is also satisfied by the Owen value and Levy-McLean value.
Hence, computing complexity in the more general case (i.e. without restricting to any
particular class of TU games) is not higher than for the Shapley value.
We now prove that with this coalitional value the Harsanyi paradox disappears.
Proposition 3.1 The coalitional value ζ is joint-monotonic in convex games.
Proof. We proceed by induction on m, the size of C. For m = 2, the result is trivial.
Assume the result is true for coalition structures of size m− 1. Let Cq, Cr ∈ C. Assume
w.l.o.g. q = m − 1 and r = m. Let C∗ = {C∗1 , C∗2 , ...., C∗m−1} where C∗p = Cp for all
p < m − 1 and C∗m−1 = Cm−1 ∪ Cm. Let M∗ = {1, 2, ...,m− 1}, and let ω ∈ RM , ω∗ ∈
RM∗ be defined as ωp = ω∗p =
|Cp|
|N | for all p < m − 1, ωm−1 = |Cm−1||N | , ωm = |Cm||N | and
ω∗m−1 = ωm−1 + ωm. Under Remark 3.1, it is enough to prove that
ϕωMm−1 (v/C) + ϕωMm (v/C) ≤ ϕω
∗M∗
m−1 (v/C∗) .
For simplicity, denote u = v/C and u∗ = v/C∗.
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) (Lemma 1) proved that ϕωMq can be inductively
computed as ϕωMq (v) = ωqv (M)− ωqv (M\q) +
∑
p∈M\q ωpϕ
ωM\p
q (v). Hence,
ϕωMm−1 (u) + ϕ
ωM
m (u) = ωm−1u (M)− ωm−1u (M\ (m− 1))
+
∑
p∈M\(m−1)
ωpϕ
ωM\p
m−1 (u)
+ ωmu (M)− ωmu (M\m) +
∑
p∈M\m
ωpϕ
ωM\p
m (u)
=ωm−1u (M)− ωm−1u (M\ (m− 1))
+ ωmu (M)− ωmu (M\m)
+ ωmϕ
ωM\m
m−1 (u) + ωm−1ϕ
ωM\(m−1)
m (u)
+
∑
p<m−1
ωp
(
ϕ
ωM\p
m−1 (u) + ϕ
ωM\p
m (u)
)
and
ϕω
∗M∗
m−1 (u
∗) = ω∗m−1u
∗ (M∗)− ω∗m−1u∗ (M∗\ (m− 1)) +
∑
p<m−1
ω∗pϕ
ω∗M∗\p
m−1 (u
∗)
= (ωm−1 + ωm)u (M)− (ωm−1 + ωm)u (M\ {m− 1,m})
+
∑
p<m−1
ω∗pϕ
ω∗M∗\p
m−1 (u
∗) .
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Under the induction hypothesis, ϕ
ωM\p
m−1 (u)+ϕ
ωM\p
m (u) ≤ ϕωM∗\pm−1 (u∗) for all p < m−1.
Hence, it is enough to prove,
ωm−1u (M)− ωm−1u (M\ (m− 1)) + ωmu (M)
− ωmu (M\m) + ωmϕωM\mm−1 (u) + ωm−1ϕωM\(m−1)m (u)
≤ (ωm−1 + ωm)u (M)− (ωm−1 + ωm)u (M\ {m− 1,m}) .
Simplifying and rearranging terms,
ωm−1
[
u (M\ (m− 1))− u (M\ {m− 1,m})− ϕωM\(m−1)m (u)
]
+ ωm
[
u (M\m)− u (M\ {m− 1,m})− ϕωM\mm−1 (u)
]
must be nonnegative. In fact, both terms are. We check it for the second one (the first
is analogous):
ϕ
ωM\m
m−1 (u) ≤ u (M\m)− u (M\ {m− 1,m}) .
It is well-known (Kalai and Samet, 1987, Theorem 1) that the weighted Shapley value
is a weighted average of marginal contributions. Since (N, v) is convex, the TU game
(M\m,u) is convex too. This implies that the maximal marginal contribution of m − 1
in (M\m,u) is u (M\m)− u (M\ {m− 1,m}). Hence we conclude the result.
As opposed, Proposition 3.1 does not hold for the Owen value φ. Take the TU game
(N, v) given in Example 3.1. This is a convex game with ϕN (v) = (10, 10, 4). Since
φN (v) = (12, 9, 3), forming coalition {2, 3} is disadvantageous for both players 2 and 3.
Proposition 3.1 does not hold in general for nonconvex games, as the next example
shows:
Example 3.2 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and v be defined as v ({1}) = v ({2}) = v (T ) = 0,
v ({1, 2}) = v ({1, 2} ∪ T ) = 360 and v ({1} ∪ T ) = v ({2} ∪ T ) = 180 for all T ⊂
{3, 4, 5}, T 6= ∅. This TU game is superadditive but not convex. Consider the coalition
structure C = {{1} , {2} , {3, 4} , {5}}, i.e. players 3 and 4 form coalition. Then, ζN =
(147, 147, 12, 12, 42).
Consider now the coalition structure C∗ = {{1} , {2} , {3, 4, 5}}, i.e. player 5 joins forces
with coalition {3, 4}. Then, ζN = (153, 153, 18, 18, 18).
4 The non-cooperative mechanism
In this section we describe the non-cooperative mechanism. Even though the model is
defined for NTU games, we focus on TU games and bargaining problems.
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Fix (N, V, C) ∈ CNTU . For each S ⊂ N , we denote as ΓS the set of applications γ :
CS → S satisfying γ
(
C ′q
) ∈ C ′q for each C ′q ∈ CS. For simplicity, we denote γq := γ (C ′q).
Moreover, we denote as λS the weight vector in the subgame (S, V ), i.e., λSq =
|C′q|
|S| for all
S ⊂ N and all C ′q ∈ CS.
The coalitional non-cooperative mechanism associated with (N, V, C) and ρ ∈ [0, 1) is
defined as follows:
In each round there is a set S ⊂ N of active players. In the first round, S = N .
Each round has one or two stages. In the first stage, a proposer is randomly
chosen from each coalition. Namely, a function γ ∈ ΓS is randomly chosen,
being each γ equally likely to be chosen. The coalitions play sequentially (say,
for example, in the order (C ′1, C
′
2, ..., C
′
m′)) in the following way: γ1 proposes
a feasible payoff, i.e. a vector in V (S). The members of C ′1\γ1 are then asked
in some prespecified order to accept or reject the proposal. If one of them
rejects the proposal, then we move to the next round where the set of active
players is S with probability ρ and S\γ1 with probability 1− ρ. In the latter
case, player γ1 gets rγ1 . If all the players accept the proposal, we move on
to the next coalition, C ′2. Then, players of C
′
2 proceed to repeat the process
under the same conditions, and so on. If all the proposals are accepted in each
coalition, the proposers are called representatives. We denote the proposal of
γq as a (S, γq) ∈ V (S).
In the second stage, a proposal is randomly chosen. The probability of a (S, γr)
being chosen is λSr =
|C′r|
|S| , i.e. proportional to the size of the coalition that
supports it. Assume a (S, γq) is chosen. We call player γq the representative-
proposer, or simply RP. If all the members of S\C ′q accept a (S, γq)– they are
asked in some prespecified order – then the game ends with these payoffs.
If it is rejected by at least one member of S\C ′q, then we move to the next
round where, with probability ρ, the set of active players is again S and, with
probability 1−ρ, the entire coalition C ′q drops out and the set of active players
becomes S\C ′q. In the latter case each i ∈ C ′q gets ri.
Clearly, given any set of strategies, this mechanism finishes in a finite number of
rounds with probability 1.
A key feature is that, when there is no rejection, each player has the same probability
to be chosen RP. Hence, players do not loose their “right to talk” when joining a coalition.
The mechanism generalizes Hart and Mas-Colell (1996)’s for trivial coalition struc-
tures. For C = {N}, the second stage is trivial, since there is a single representative
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and a single proposal. Moreover, the first stage coincides with Hart and Mas-Colell’s
mechanism. For C = {{i}}i∈N , the first stage is trivial. Each player states a proposal,
and in the second stage a proposal is randomly selected with equal probability and voted
by the rest of the players/coalitions.
As usual, we consider stationary subgame perfect equilibria. In this context, an
equilibrium is stationary if the players’ strategies depend only on the set of active players.
They do not depend, however, on the previous history or the number of played rounds.
The main result of the paper, that provides a non-cooperative justification for ζN , is
the following:
Theorem 4.1 There exists a unique expected stationary subgame perfect equilibrium pay-
off in strictly convex games, which equals ζN .
This result is an immediate consequence of Propositions 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 proved in
Section 6 (Appendix).
It is worthy to analyze a particular example.
Example 4.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and v be defined as v ({1, 2}) = 12, v (N) = 24 and
v (S) = 0 otherwise. Consider the coalition structure C = {{1} , {2, 3}}, i.e. players 2
and 3 form coalition.
When there are two active players, the mechanism coincides with the mechanism given
by Hart and Mas-Colell, and thus the expected final payoffs are ζ{1,2} = (6, 6) and ζ{1,3} =
ζ{2,3} = (0, 0).
Assume now the set of active players is N . For simplicity, assume ρ = 0. Then,
player 1 would propose a (N, 1) = (24, 0, 0), i.e. he offers the other players their respective
continuation payoff after rejection in the second stage. The proposals given by player 2
and player 3 are subtler, because they would not propose to each other their continuation
payoff after rejection in the first stage. Instead, they propose to each other a value that,
averaging with player 1’s proposal, results in their respective continuation payoffs after
rejection. In particular, player 3 would propose a (N, 3) = (0, 9, 15), because (taking into
account that player 1 would be the RP in the second stage with probability 1
3
) player 2’s
expected final payoff after rejection is 1
3
0 + 2
3
9 = 6. Analogously, player 2 would propose
a (N, 2) = (0, 24, 0).
Once these proposals are accepted in the first stage, in the second stage the proposal
of coalition {2, 3} is either (0, 24, 0) (probability 1
2
), or (0, 9, 15) (probability 1
2
). In the
second stage, the final proposal will be (24, 0, 0) with probability 1
3
, and either (0, 24, 0) or
12
(0, 9, 15) with probability 2
3
. On average, the expected final payoff is
1
3
(24, 0, 0) +
2
3
(
1
2
(0, 24, 0) +
1
2
(0, 9, 15)
)
= (8, 11, 5) = ζN .
The last result of this Section deals with pure bargaining problems:
Proposition 4.1 There exists at least one stationary subgame perfect equilibrium in pure
bargaining problems. Moreover, as ρ approaches 1, any stationary subgame perfect equi-
librium payoffs a (ρ) converge to the Nash solution.
In particular, for unanimity games, the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
payoff is xi = 1/ |N | for all i ∈ N and any coalition structure.
Proof. Clearly, when the set of active players is S 6= N , there exists a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium payoff which equals rS. Assume S = N . It is straightforward to
check that the proposals corresponding to a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium are
characterized by:
Q-1 aj (N, i) = ρaj (N) + (1− ρ) rj for all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j; and
Q-2 a (N, i) ∈ ∂V (N) for all i ∈ N .
Moreover, a (N) = 1|N |
∑
i∈N a (N, i) (see Proposition 6.4 in Section 6). These are the
conditions in Proposition 1 in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), and the result follows from
Theorem 3 in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996).
5 Concluding remark
In general, the mechanism does not implement ζ for nonconvex games. Take ρ = 0. Take
the TU game given in Example 3.2 with coalition structure {{1} , {2} , {3, 4, 5}}. Assume
the only equilibrium payoff is ζS for all S 6= N . Some of these values are given in the
following table:
S ζS
{1, 2} (180, 180)
{1, 2, 4, 5} (150, 150, 30, 30)
{1, 3, 4, 5} (45, 45, 45, 45)
{2, 3, 4, 5} (45, 45, 45, 45)
We compute the equilibrium payoff when S = N . In the second stage of the mech-
anism, coalitions {1} and {2} would offer 45 to each player in {3, 4, 5} (this is their
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continuation payoff after either coalition {1} or coalition {2} leaves the game). Assume
that player 3 is the proposer of coalition {3, 4, 5} in the first stage. Then, any accept-
able proposal should satisfy ai (N, 3)
γ = 180 for all i ∈ {1, 2} and aj (N, 3)γ = 20 for
all j ∈ {4, 5} (so that 1
5
aj (N, 1)
γ + 1
5
aj (N, 2)
γ + 3
5
aj (N, 3)
γ = 30, that is, player j’s
continuation payoff after rejection). Hence a3 (N, 3)
γ ≤ −40. This leaves player 3 with a
negative final expected payoff 6. Hence, it is optimal for player 3 to make an unacceptable
proposal and receive zero. The final equilibrium payoff would be (150, 150, 20, 20, 20) in
expected terms, whereas ζN = (153, 153, 18, 18, 18).
In equilibrium, making acceptable proposals is profitable if the conditions given in
Proposition 6.3 in Section 6 hold. These conditions state that the aggregate payoff of
the members of a coalition is higher than their aggregate payoff when one of its members
(the proposer) leaves the game and receives ri. This generates sufficient surplus to be
profitable for the proposer to make an acceptable offer.
It is still possible to implement ζ for general TU games by imposing an additional
feature to the mechanism: Assume that each excluded player i is charged with a penalty
pi > 0. Hence, the final payoff after exclusion is ri − pi. Under these circumstances, all
the offers are accepted in equilibrium as long as
∑
j∈C′q ζ
S >
∑
j∈C′q\i ζ
S\i + ri − pi for all
S ⊂ N and i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS. Hence, for p high enough7 the result in Theorem 4.1 holds for
any TU game.
This penalty may have a justification in the model. As Hart and Mas-Colell (1996)
(Section 7) point out, ri = v ({i}) may represent the total worth of player i assuming
that he is the only member of the society and control a common resource, whereas ri−pi
(a lower amount) is what he would get if he leaves the society.
6 Appendix
Fix (N, v, C). In the next proposition we describe an inductive formula to compute ζ:
Proposition 6.1 The coalitional value ζ can be defined inductively as follows: ζ
{i}
i = ri
for all i ∈ N . Assume we know ζT ∈ RT for all T ⊂ S, T 6= S. Then, ζSi =
1∣∣C ′q∣∣
λSq v (S) + ∑
j∈C′q\i
(
ζ
S\j
i − ζS\ij
)
+
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr ∑
j∈C′q
ζ
S\C′r
j − λSq
∑
j∈C′r
ζ
S\C′q
j

for all i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS.
6This payoff is at most −6, not −40, since with probabitity 25 the offer in the second stage comes
from coalition {1} or coalition {2}.
7In the previous example, any pi > 6 would suffice.
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Proof. The result is clear for ζ{i}. We prove the result for (S, v, CS). Let M ′ ={
q : C ′q ∈ CS
}
and m′ = |M ′|.
Claim 6.1 Given i, j ∈ C ′q ∈ CS, ϕC
′
q\j
i
(
v∗Sq
)
= ϕ
C′q\j
i
(
v
∗S\j
q
)
.
The proof is straightforward and we omit it.
Claim 6.2 Given q, r ∈M ′, ϕλSM ′\rq (v/CS) = v∗S\C
′
r
q
(
C ′q
)
.
The weights λSq are proportional to the weights λ
S\C′r
q for all q ∈M ′\r. Hence,
ϕλ
SM ′\r
q (v/CS) = ϕλ
S\C′rM ′\r
q (v/CS) .
Moreover, v/CS (Q) = v/CS\C′r (Q) for all Q ⊂M ′\r. Hence,
ϕλ
S\C′rM ′\r
q (v/CS) = ϕλ
S\C′rM ′\r
q
(
v/CS\C′r
)
= v∗S\C
′
r
q
(
C ′q
)
.
Claim 6.3 Given q, r ∈M ′, v∗S\C′rq
(
C ′q
)
=
∑
j∈C′q ζ
S\C′r
j .
By definition,
∑
j∈C′q ζ
S\C′r
j =
∑
j∈C′q ϕ
C′q
j
(
v
∗S\C′r
q
)
= v
∗S\C′r
q
(
C ′q
)
.
We now use the claims to prove the result. It follows from Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001) (Lemma 1) that the weighted Shapley value can be computed as
ϕωNi (v) = ωiv (N) +
∑
j∈N\i
(
ωjϕ
ωN\j
i (v)− ωiϕωN\ij (v)
)
(1)
for all i ∈ N , ω ∈ RN++. Remark that the Shapley value ϕN coincides with ϕωN for
ωi =
1
|N | for all i ∈ N .
Given i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS,
ζSi = ϕ
C′q
i
(
v∗Sq
) (1)
=
1∣∣C ′q∣∣
v∗Sq (C ′q)+ ∑
j∈C′q\i
(
ϕ
C′q\j
i
(
v∗Sq
)− ϕC′q\ij (v∗Sq ))

(Claim 6.1)
=
1∣∣C ′q∣∣
v∗Sq (C ′q)+ ∑
j∈C′q\i
(
ζ
S\j
i − ζS\ij
) . (2)
Taking into account that
∑
r∈M ′ λ
S
r = 1, v
∗S
q
(
C ′q
)
=
ϕλ
SM ′
q (v/CS)
(1)
= λSq v/CS (M ′) +
∑
r∈M ′\q
(
λSrϕ
λSM ′\r
q (v/CS)− λSq ϕλ
SM ′\q
r (v/CS)
)
(Claim 6.2)
= λSq v (S) +
∑
r∈M ′\q
(
λSr v
∗S\C′r
q
(
C ′q
)− λSq v∗S\C′qr (C ′r))
(Claim 6.3)
= λSq v (S) +
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr ∑
j∈C′q
ζ
S\C′r
j − λSq
∑
j∈C′r
ζ
S\C′q
j
 . (3)
The result comes from combining (2) and (3).
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Corollary 6.1 For any S ⊂ N and C ′q ∈ CS,
∑
i∈C′q
ζSi = λ
S
q v (S) +
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr ∑
j∈C′q
ζ
S\C′r
j − λSq
∑
j∈C′r
ζ
S\C′q
j
 .
Proof. It follows from Proposition 6.1.
The next property has the flavor of the balanced contributions property of Myerson’s
(Myerson, 1980), and it is also satisfied by the Owen value (Calvo et al., 1996; Bergantin˜os
and Vidal-Puga, 2005):
Proposition 6.2 For all S ⊂ N and i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS,
∑
j∈C′q\i
(
ζSi − ζS\ji
)
=
∑
j∈C′q\i
(
ζSj − ζS\ij
)
.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 6.1 and Corollary 6.1.
The next proposition states that, in strictly convex TU games, the aggregate payoff
in a coalition is higher than when one of its members leaves and gets his autarchy payoff.
Proposition 6.3 For strictly convex TU games,
∑
j∈C′q\i ζ
S\i
j + ri <
∑
j∈C′q ζ
S
j for all
i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS, S 6= {i}.
Proof. Let M ′ = {r : C ′r ∈ CS}. Since the game is strictly convex, (M ′, v/CS) is
also strictly convex and thus strictly superadditive. Assume first C ′q = {i} (hence∑
j∈C′q\i ζ
S\i
j = 0). Under Remark 3.1, it is enough to prove ri < ϕ
λSM ′
q (v/CS), which is
straightforward given the strict superadditivity of (M ′, v/CS) and the fact that ϕλSq is a
weighted average of marginal contributions.
Assume now C ′q 6= {i}. Under Remark 3.1, it is enough to prove
ϕλ
S\iM ′
q
(
v/CS\i
)
+ ri < ϕ
λSM ′
q (v/CS) .
It is straightforward to check that λ
S\i
r =
|S|
|S|−1λ
S
r for all r ∈ M ′\q, whereas λS\iq =
|C′q|−1
|C′q|
|S|
|S|−1λ
S
q . Hence, when weights change from λ
S to λS\i, coalition q reduces its
relative weight in the game between coalitions. Since
(
M ′, v/CS\i
)
is strictly convex,
ϕλ
S\iM ′
q
(
v/CS\i
) ≤ ϕλSM ′q (v/CS\i).
Hence, it is enough to prove
ϕλ
SM ′
q
(
v/CS\i
)
+ ri < ϕ
λSM ′
q (v/CS) .
Consider the following TU games on M ′:
uq (Q) =
{
0 if q /∈ Q
ri if q ∈ Q
16
and v′ (Q) = v/CS\i (Q) + uq (Q) for all Q ⊂M ′.
Under strict superadditivity, v′ (Q) = v/CS (Q) if q /∈ Q and v′ (Q) < v/CS (Q) if
q ∈ Q. It is well-known from Kalai and Samet (1985) that the weighted Shapley value is
monotonic. Thus ϕλ
SM ′
q (v
′) < ϕλ
SM ′
q (v/CS).
Since the weighted Shapley value satisfies additivity ϕλ
SM ′
q
(
v/CS\i
)
+ ϕλ
SM ′
q (uq) =
ϕλ
SM ′
q (v
′). Moreover, ϕλ
SM ′
q (uq) = ri. Hence,
ϕλ
SM ′
q
(
v/CS\i
)
+ ri = ϕ
λSM ′
q (v
′) < ϕλ
SM ′
q (v/CS) .
We analyze the general stationary subgame perfect equilibria. Let S denote the set of
active players. Given a set of stationary strategies, denote as a(S, i)γ ∈ V (S) the payoff
proposed by i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS when the set of proposers is determined by some γ ∈ ΓS,i. Thus,
for a given γ ∈ ΓS,
a(S)γ :=
∑
C′q∈CS
λSq a (S, γq)
γ ∈ V (S) (4)
is the expected final payoff when all the proposals are accepted and γ determines the set
of proposers (or representatives).
Denote
a(S) :=
∑
γ∈ΓS
1
|ΓS|a (S)
γ ∈ V (S) (5)
as the expected final payoff when all the proposals are accepted.
Given i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS, let ΓS,i be the subset of functions γ ∈ ΓS such that γq = i. Notice
that |ΓS| = |ΓS,i|
∣∣C ′q∣∣ for all i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS.
Let
a (S, i) :=
∑
γ∈ΓS,i
1
|ΓS,i|a (S, i)
γ (6)
be the expected payoff proposed by i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS when he is a proposer.
The next proposition states that the probability that the final proposal comes from
a particular player (when all the proposals are accepted) is equal for all the players, i.e.
they maintain their respective “rights to talk”.
Proposition 6.4 for all S ⊂ N , a (S) = ∑i∈S 1|S|a (S, i) .
Proof. Given S ⊂ N ,
a (S)
(5)
=
∑
γ∈ΓS
1
|ΓS|a (S)
γ (4)=
∑
γ∈ΓS
1
|ΓS|
∑
C′q∈CS
λSq a (S, γq)
γ
=
∑
C′q∈CS
λSq
∑
γ∈ΓS
1
|ΓS|a (S, γq)
γ =
∑
C′q∈CS
λSq
∑
i∈C′q
1∣∣C ′q∣∣
∑
γ∈ΓS,i
1
|ΓS,i|a (S, γq)
γ .
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Since a (S, γq)
γ = a (S, i)γ for all i ∈ C ′q, γ ∈ ΓS,i,
a (S) =
∑
C′q∈CS
λSq
∑
i∈C′q
1∣∣C ′q∣∣
∑
γ∈ΓS,i
1
|ΓS,i|a (S, i)
γ .
Under (6),
a (S) =
∑
C′q∈CS
λSq
∑
i∈C′q
1∣∣C ′q∣∣a (S, i) =
∑
C′q∈CS
1
|S|
∑
i∈C′q
a (S, i) =
∑
i∈S
1
|S|a (S, i) .
Proposition 6.5 Assume a set of proposals
(
a (S, i)γi∈S,γ∈ΓS,i
)
S⊂N
satisfies the following
three conditions for all S ⊂ N :
P-1 aj (S, i)
γ = ρaj (S) + (1− ρ) aj
(
S\C ′q
)
for all i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS, γ ∈ ΓS,i and j ∈ S\C ′q ;
P-2 aj (S)
γ = ρaj (S) + (1− ρ) aj (S\i) for all i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS, γ ∈ ΓS,i and j ∈ C ′q\i ;
P-3
∑
j∈S aj (S, i)
γ = v (S) for all i ∈ S and γ ∈ ΓS,i.
Then, a (S) = ζS for all S ⊂ N .
Proof. By P-3, ∑
i∈S
ai (S) = v (S) . (7)
Fix i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS. From (4) it is readily checked that, for any j ∈ C ′q\i, γ ∈ ΓS,i:
aj (S, i)
γ =
1
λSq
aj (S)
γ −
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
aj (S, γr)
γ .
Under P-1 and P-2, aj (S, i)
γ =
1
λSq
[ρaj(S) + (1− ρ)aj(S\i)]−
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
[ρaj(S) + (1− ρ)aj(S\C ′r)]
= ρaj(S) + (1− ρ)
 1
λSq
aj(S\i)−
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
aj(S\C ′r)
 . (8)
Under Proposition 6.4 and (6),
|S| ai (S) (Proposition 6.4)=
∑
j∈S
ai (S, j)
(6)
=
∑
j∈S
∑
γ∈ΓS,j
1
|ΓS,j|ai (S, j)
γ
=
∑
γ∈ΓS,i
1
|ΓS,i|ai (S, i)
γ +
∑
j∈C′q\i
∑
γ∈ΓS,j
1
|ΓS,j|ai (S, j)
γ +
∑
j∈S\C′q
∑
γ∈ΓS,j
1
|ΓS,j|ai (S, j)
γ .
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We study the three terms one by one. For the first term:∑
γ∈ΓS,i
1
|ΓS,i|ai (S, i)
γ (P-3)= v (S)−
∑
γ∈ΓS,i
1
|ΓS,i|
∑
j∈S\i
aj (S, i)
γ
= v (S)−
∑
γ∈ΓS,i
1
|ΓS,i|
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
∑
j∈C′r
aj (S, i)
γ −
∑
γ∈ΓS,i
1
|ΓS,i|
∑
j∈C′q\i
aj (S, i)
γ
(P-1)-(8)
= v (S)−
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
∑
j∈C′r
[
ρaj (S) + (1− ρ) aj
(
S\C ′q
)]
−
∑
j∈C′q\i
ρaj (S) + (1− ρ)
 1
λSq
aj (S\i)−
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
aj (S\C ′r)

under (7),
∑
j∈S\i ρaj (S) = ρ (v (S)− ai (S)) and thus
= v (S)− ρ (v (S)− ai (S))− (1− ρ)
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
∑
j∈C′r
aj
(
S\C ′q
)
− (1− ρ)
∑
j∈C′q\i
 1
λSq
aj (S\i)−
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
aj (S\C ′r)
 .
For the second term:∑
j∈C′q\i
∑
γ∈ΓS,j
1
|ΓS,j|ai (S, j)
γ (8)=
∑
j∈C′q\i
ρai (S) + (1− ρ)
 1
λSq
ai (S\j)−
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
ai (S\C ′r)

= ρ
(∣∣C ′q∣∣− 1) ai (S)
+ (1− ρ)
 ∑
j∈C′q\i
1
λSq
ai (S\j)−
(∣∣C ′q∣∣− 1) ∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
ai (S\C ′r)
 .
For the third term:∑
j∈S\C′q
∑
γ∈ΓS,j
1
|ΓS,j|ai (S, j)
γ (P-1)=
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
∑
j∈C′r
[ρai (S) + (1− ρ) ai (S\C ′r)]
= ρ
(|S| − ∣∣C ′q∣∣) ai (S) + (1− ρ) ∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
|C ′r| ai (S\C ′r) .
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Hence, adding terms, |S| ai (S) =
v (S)− ρv (S)− (1− ρ)
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
∑
j∈C′r
aj
(
S\C ′q
)
−
∑
j∈C′q\i
(1− ρ)
 1
λSq
aj (S\i)−
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
aj (S\C ′r)

+ (1− ρ)
 ∑
j∈C′q\i
1
λSq
ai (S\j) +
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
ai (S\C ′r)

+ ρ |S| ai (S) .
Rearranging terms and dividing by 1− ρ, |S| ai (S) =
= v (S) +
∑
j∈C′q\i
1
λSq
(ai (S\j)− aj (S\i))
+
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
∑
j∈C′q
aj (S\C ′r)−
∑
j∈C′r
aj
(
S\C ′q
) .
Hence,
ai (S) =
λSq∣∣C ′q∣∣v (S) +
∑
j∈C′q\i
1∣∣C ′q∣∣ (ai (S\j)− aj (S\i))
+
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
∑
j∈C′q
λSr∣∣C ′q∣∣aj (S\C ′r)−
∑
j∈C′r
λSq∣∣C ′q∣∣aj (S\C ′q)
 .
Under Proposition 6.1, a (S) = ζS is easily deduced following a standard induction
argument.
Proposition 6.6 For any ρ, a set of proposals
(
a (S, i)γi∈S,γ∈ΓS,i
)
S⊂N
can be supported
as a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for strictly convex games if and only if they
satisfy P-1, P-2 and P-3.
Proof. Besides the result, we will also prove that all the proposals are accepted and
ai (S)
γ ≥ ρai (S) + (1− ρ) ri for all i ∈ S ⊂ N and γ ∈ ΓS,i.
The argument is by induction. The result holds trivially when |N | = 1. Assume that
it is true when there are at most |N | − 1 players.
Assume we are in a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium in a strictly convex game.
Under the induction hypothesis, the expected payoff for the players in S 6= N in any
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stationary subgame perfect equilibrium with S as set of active players is a (S). Let
b ∈ RN denote the expected final payoff allocation when N is the set of active players.
We proceed by a series of Claims:
Claim 6.4 Given Cq ∈ C in the second stage, assume the proposers are determined
by γ ∈ ΓN and the RP is γq. Then, all the players in N\Cq accept γq’s proposal if
ai (N, γq) > ρbi+(1− ρ) ai (N\Cq) for all i ∈ N\Cq. If ai (N, γq) < ρbi+(1− ρ) ai (N\Cq)
for some i ∈ N\Cq, then the proposal is rejected.
In the case of rejection in the second stage, the expected payoff of a player i ∈ N\Cq
is, under the induction hypothesis, ρbi + (1− ρ) ai (N\Cq). Thus, the result follows from
a standard argument in this kind of bargaining.
Claim 6.5 Let γ ∈ ΓN determine the set of proposers in the first stage. Given Cq ∈ C,
assume we are in the subgame that begins after player γq makes his proposal. Assume
also that all the coalitions with choose representative after Cq are bound to choose their
proposer as representative should γq’s proposal be accepted. Let b
γq be the expected final
payoff allocation if γq’s proposal is accepted. Then, all the players in Cq\γq accept γq’s
proposal if b
γq
i > ρbi+(1− ρ) ai (N\γq) for every i ∈ Cq\γq. If bγqi < ρbi+(1− ρ) ai (N\γq)
for some i ∈ Cq\γq, the proposal is rejected.
The result follows the same arguments as in the proof of Claim 6.4. Under these
hypothesis, in the case of rejection of γq’s proposal in the first stage, the expected payoff
to a player i ∈ Cq\γ is ρbi + (1− ρ) ai (N\γq).
Claim 6.6 All the offers in the first stage are accepted.
Assume coalitions play the first stage in the order (C1, C2, ..., Cm) and that the mech-
anism reaches coalition Cm, i.e. there has been no previous rejection. Assume γm’s
proposal is rejected. This means the final payoff for player γm is ρbγm + (1− ρ) rγm .
Define a new proposal a (N, γm) for player γm. First, given ε > 0, let c
ε (N, γm) be
defined as follows:
cεi (N, γm) :=

− ∑
Cq∈C\Cm
λNq
λNm
ai (N\Cq) + 1λNm ri + ε if i = γm
1
λNm
ai (N\γm)−
∑
Cq∈C\Cm
λNq
λNm
ai (N\Cq) + ε if i ∈ Cm\γm
ai (N\Cm) + ε if i ∈ N\Cm.
(9)
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For ε > 0 small enough, we prove that
∑
i∈N c
ε
i (N, γm) ≤ v (N): Under the induction
hypothesis, a (S, i)γi∈S,γ∈ΓS,i satisfies P-1, P-2 and P-3 for all S 6= N . Under Proposition
6.5, a (S) = ζS for all S 6= N . Hence, cε (N, γm) can be re-written as
cεi (N, γm) =

− ∑
Cq∈C\Cm
λNq
λNm
ζ
N\Cq
i +
1
λNm
ri + ε if i = γm
1
λNm
ζ
N\γm
i −
∑
Cq∈C\Cm
λNq
λNm
ζ
N\Cq
i + ε if i ∈ Cm\γm
ζ
N\Cm
i + ε if i ∈ N\Cm.
Adding terms,
λNm
∑
i∈N
cεi (N, γm) = |N |λNmε+ rγm +
∑
i∈Cm\γm
ζ
N\γm
i
+
∑
Cq∈C\Cm
∑
i∈Cq
λNmζ
N\Cm
i −
∑
Cq∈C\Cm
∑
i∈Cm
λNq ζ
N\Cq
i
(Proposition 6.1)
= |N |λNmε+ rγm + λNmv (N) +
∑
i∈Cm\γm
ζN\iγm − |Cm| ζNγm
= |N |λNmε+ rγm + λNmv (N) +
∑
i∈Cm\γm
(
ζN\iγm − ζNγm
)− ζNγm
(Proposition 6.2)
= |N |λNmε+ rγm + λNmv (N) +
∑
i∈Cm\γm
(
ζ
N\γm
i − ζNi
)
− ζNγm
= |N |λNmε+ rγm + λNmv (N) +
∑
i∈Cm\γm
ζ
N\γm
i −
∑
i∈Cm
ζNi
(Proposition 6.3)
< |N |λNmε+ λNmv (N) .
Hence, ∑
i∈N
cεi (N, γm) < |N | ε+ v (N)
and hence
∑
i∈N c
ε
i (N, γm) ≤ v (N) for ε small enough.
Define a (N, γm) = ρb+ (1− ρ) cε (N, γm) as the new proposal for player γm.
In case of rejection, the expected final payoff for any player i ∈ Cm\γm is ρbi +
(1− ρ) ai (N\γm).
If all the players in Cm\γm accept a (N, γm) and the proposal chosen in the second
stage is from Cq 6= Cm (probability λNq ), then any player i ∈ Cm\γm can obtain ρbi +
(1− ρ) ai (N\Cq) by rejecting it. If the proposal chosen in the second stage is from Cm
(probability λNm), then it is accepted (by Claim 6.4).
22
Thus, if all the players in Cm\γm accept a (N, γm), their expected final payoff is at
least ∑
Cq∈C\Cm
λNq [ρbi + (1− ρ) ai (N\Cq)] + λNmai (N, γm)
=
∑
Cq∈C\Cm
λNq [ρbi + (1− ρ) ai (N\Cq)] + λNmρbi
+ (1− ρ)
ai (N\γm)− ∑
Cq∈C\Cm
λNq ai (N\Cq) + λNmε

= ρbi + (1− ρ) ai (N\γm) + (1− ρ)λNmε
for each i ∈ Cm\γm. Thus, it is optimal for players in Cm\γm to accept a (N, γm).
Analogously, the expected final payoff for player γm after acceptance is at least∑
Cq∈C\Cm
λNq [ρbγm + (1− ρ) aγm (N\Cq)] + λNmaγm (N, γm)
=
∑
Cq∈C\Cm
λNq [ρbγm + (1− ρ) aγm (N\Cq)] + λNmρbγm
+ (1− ρ)
− ∑
Cq∈C\Cm
λNq aγm (N\Cq) + rγm + λNmε

= ρbγm + (1− ρ) rγm + (1− ρ)λNmε.
So, it is optimal for γm to change his proposal. This contradiction proves that no
proposals are rejected in the first stage in Cm. By going backwards, the same reasoning
shows that no proposal is rejected in the first stage in Cm−1, ..., C1.
Claim 6.7 All the offers in the second stage are accepted.
Suppose the proposal of γq is bound to be rejected in the second stage. Then, the
final payoff for the members of Cq (including γq) is r
Cq with probability λNm. Under Claim
6.5 and Claim 6.6, we know that b
γq
i ≥ ρbi + (1− ρ) ai (N\γq) for all i ∈ Cq\γq. Assume
that γq changes his strategy and proposes
ai (N, γq) =
{
ri + ε if i ∈ Cq
ρbi + (1− ρ) ai (N\Cq) + ε otherwise.
(10)
We proof that this proposal is feasible for ε > 0 small enough: When S is the set of
active players, each i ∈ S can assure himself at least ri. Since b is a subgame equilibrium
payoff allocation when N is the set of active players, bi ≥ ri for all i ∈ N . Moreover, the
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induction hypothesis implies that a (S) is the only subgame equilibrium payoff allocation
when S 6= N is the set of active players. Hence, ai (S) ≥ ri for all i ∈ S 6= N .
On the other hand, under P-3,
∑
i∈N\Cq ai (N\Cq) = v (N\Cq).
Hence,∑
i∈N
ai (N, γq) = |N | ε+
∑
i∈Cq
ri +
∑
i∈N\Cq
ρbi +
∑
i∈N\Cq
(1− ρ) ai (N\Cq)
= |N | ε+ ρ
∑
i∈Cq
ri +
∑
i∈N\Cq
bi
+ (1− ρ)
∑
i∈Cq
ri + v (N\Cq)

≤ |N | ε+ ρ
∑
i∈N
bi + (1− ρ)
∑
i∈Cq
ri + v (N\Cq)

≤ |N | ε+ ρv (N) + (1− ρ)
∑
i∈Cq
v ({i}) + v (N\Cq)

since (N, v) is strictly convex,
< |N | ε+ ρv (N) + (1− ρ) v (N) = |N | ε+ v (N) .
Hence, a (N, γq) is feasible for ε small enough.
Under Claim 6.4, the new proposal is bound to be accepted should γq be the RP in
the second stage. However,
(
b
γq
i
)
i∈Cq\γq increases in all coordinates. So, under Claim 6.5,
a (N, γq) is also accepted in the first stage. Moreover, the expected final payoff for γq also
increases. Hence, we are not in a subgame perfect equilibrium. This contradiction proves
that the proposals in the second stage are always accepted.
Since all the proposals are accepted, we can assure that b = a (N) and bγq = a (N)γ
for all γ ∈ ΓN .
We show now that P-1, P-2 and P-3 hold.
Suppose P-3 does not hold, i.e. there exists a player i ∈ Cq such that
∑
j∈N aj(N, i) <
v (N). Thus, there exists ε > 0 such that d ∈ RN defined as dj = aj(N, i) + ε for all
j ∈ N satisfies ∑j∈N dj < v (N).
Notice that, since the proposal a(N, i) of player i is accepted, under Claim 6.5, together
with Claim 6.6 and Claim 6.7, we know that, given γ ∈ ΓN,i, aj(N)γ ≥ ρbj+(1−ρ)aj(N\i)
for every j ∈ Cq\i and, under Claim 6.4, aj(N, i) ≥ ρbj + (1 − ρ)aj(N\Cq) for every
j ∈ N\Cq. So, if player i changes his proposal to d, it is bound to be accepted and his
expected final payoff improves by λNq ε > 0. This contradiction proves P-3.
Suppose P-2 does not hold. Let γ ∈ ΓN,i and let j0 ∈ Cq\i such that aj0(N)γ =
ρaj0 (N) + (1− ρ)aj0(N\i) + α with α 6= 0. Under Claim 6.5, α > 0.
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Assume player i changes his proposal so that aj0 (N, i) decreases β and aj (N, i) in-
creases β|N |−1 for all j ∈ N\i, with β strictly between 0 and α. The new proposal a(N, i)
satisfies the conditions of Claim 6.4 and Claim 6.5, and thus it is due to be accepted.
Also, player i improves his expected payoff by
λNq β
|N | − 1 > 0. This contradiction proves
P-2.
The reasoning for P-1 is similar to that for P-2 so it is omitted.
It remains to show that ai (N)
γ ≥ ρai (N) + (1− ρ) ri for all i ∈ N and γ ∈ ΓN,i.
Notice that player i ∈ N can guarantee himself a payoff of at least ρai (N) + (1− ρ) ri
by proposing r and accepting only proposals which give him at least ρai (N) + (1− ρ) ri
as expected final payoff. Thus, ai (N)
γ ≥ ρai (N) + (1− ρ) ri.
The next step is to show that proposals (a(S, i)i∈S)S⊂N satisfying P-1, P-2 and P-3
can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium, and ai (S)
γ ≥ ρai (S) + (1− ρ) ri for
all i ∈ S ⊂ N and γ ∈ ΓS,i.
Under the induction hypothesis, these results are true for any S 6= N . We prove first
that ai (N)
γ ≥ ρai (N) + (1− ρ) ri for all i ∈ N and γ ∈ ΓN,i.
Given i ∈ Cq ∈ C, the vector c (N, i), defined as
cj (N, i) =

− ∑
Cr∈C\Cq
λNr
λNq
ai (N\Cr) + 1λNq ri if j = i
1
λNq
aj (N\i)−
∑
Cr∈C\Cq
λNq
λNm
aj (N\Cr) if j ∈ Cq\i
aj (N\Cq) if j ∈ N\Cq.
is a feasible payoff allocation (analogous to (9)). Hence c˜ (N, i) := ρa (N)+(1− ρ) c (N, i)
is feasible, too.
Let i ∈ Cq ∈ C and γ ∈ ΓN,i. Let j ∈ Cq\i. Since a (N, i) satisfies P-1 and P-2,
λNq aj (N, i)
γ = aj (N)
γ −
∑
Cr∈C\Cq
λNr aj (N, γr)
γ
= ρaj (N) + (1− ρ) aj (N\i)
−
∑
Cr∈C\Cq
λNr [ρaj (N) + (1− ρ) aj (N\Cr)]
= λNq ρaj (N) + (1− ρ)
aj (N\i)− ∑
Cr∈C\Cq
λNr aj (N\Cr)

and hence
aj (N, i)
γ = ρaj (N) + (1− ρ)
 1
λNq
aj (N\i)−
∑
Cr∈C\Cq
λNr
λNq
aj (N\Cr)

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for all j ∈ Cq\i. But this expression does not depend on γ. Hence, aj (N, i) = aj (N, i)γ
for all γ ∈ ΓN,i. Under P-1 and P-3, a (N, i) = a (N, i)γ for all γ ∈ ΓN,i.
Furthermore, aj (N, i) = c˜j (N, i) for all j ∈ N\i. Hence, a (N, i) ≥ c˜ (N, i) because∑
j∈N aj (N, i) = v (N) and
∑
j∈N c˜j (N, i) ≤ v (N). Thus,
ai (N, i) ≥ c˜i (N, i) = ρai (N) + (1− ρ)
− ∑
Cr∈C\Cq
λNr
λNq
ai (N\Cr) + 1
λNq
ri
 . (11)
Under P-1 and (11),
ai (N)
γ =
∑
Cr∈C
λNr ai (N, γr)
γ =
∑
Cr∈C\Cq
λNr ai (N, γr)
γ + λNq ai (N, i)
≥
∑
Cr∈C\Cq
λNr [ρai (N) + (1− ρ) ai (N\Cr)]
+λNq ρai (N) + (1− ρ)
− ∑
Cr∈C\Cq
λNr ai (N\Cr) + ri

= ρai (N) + (1− ρ) ri.
The last step is to prove that the strategies corresponding to these proposals form
a subgame perfect equilibrium. The reasoning is analogous to those used by Hart and
Mas-Colell (1996) (Proposition 1). Under the induction hypothesis, the result hold in
any subgame after a player (or coalition) has dropped out. Fix a player i ∈ Cq ∈ C.
If he rejects the offer from a proposer j ∈ Cq\i, his expected final payoff is ρai (N) +
(1− ρ) ai (N\j). If he rejects the offer from a RP j ∈ N\Cq, his expected final payoff
is ρai (N) + (1− ρ) ai (N\Cq). In any case, his expected final payoff is the same as that
the other player is offering, and he does not improve by rejecting it. If the proposer is
player i himself (i.e. γ ∈ ΓN,i), the strategies of the other players do not allow him to
decrease his proposal to any of them (since it would be rejected under Claim 6.4 and
Claim 6.5). Moreover, increasing one or more of his offers to the other players keeping
the rest unaltered implies his own payoff decreases (under P-3). Finally, if he proposes an
unacceptable offer, his expected final payoff will be at most ρai (N) + (1− ρ) ri, whereas
the proposed strategy gives him ai (N)
γ. Since ai (N)
γ ≥ ρai (N) + (1− ρ) ri, he does
not improve.
Proposition 6.7 There always exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for convex
games.
Proof. Under Proposition 6.6, it is enough to prove that there exits a set of proposals
satisfying P-1, P-2 and P-3. We define ai ({i} , i) = ri for all i ∈ S. Assume we have
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defined a (T, i) for all i ∈ T ⊂, T 6= S. We define:
aj (S, i)
γ = ρaj (S) + (1− ρ) aj
(
S\C ′q
)
for all i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS, γ ∈ ΓS,i and j ∈ S\C ′q ;
aj (S, i)
γ = ρaj(S) + (1− ρ)
 1
λSq
aj(S\i)−
∑
C′r∈CS\C′q
λSr
λSq
aj(S\C ′r)

for all i ∈ C ′q ∈ CS, γ ∈ ΓS,i and j ∈ C ′q\i ; and
ai (S, i)
γ = v (S)−
∑
j∈S\i
aj (S, i)
for all i ∈ S and γ ∈ ΓS,i.
It is straightforward to check that these proposals satisfy P-1, P-2 and P-3.
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